Introduction
THERE HAS LONG BEEN A PROBLEMATIC RELATIONSHIP between the Chinese and opium, however many dimensions of this relationship have escaped serious attention from scholars. The issues, so far as most historians have been concerned, have revolved around a limited range of topics. Much work has been done on the opium trade to China in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; the "opium wars" between China and Britain; and the campaigns to suppress the opium trade to and in China around the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century (Booth 1996; Chang 1964; Coates 1911; Collis 1968; Fairbank 1953; Fay 1975; Greenberg 1951; Johnson 1975; Le Fevour 1968; Owen 1934 Owen rep. 1968 Scott 1969; Spence 1975; Stelle 1938; Tan 1974 Tan , 1978 Wakeman 1966; Waley 1958; Walker 1991; Waung 1977; Wong 1998) . Until recently, there have been relatively few studies of the opium trade in the context of the Chinese diaspora, particularly within Southeast Asia. I argue here that
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The Context of Chinese Labor Migration
The junk traders who had been coming to Southeast Asia were a relatively old phenomenon. Chinese traders, mostly based in Fujian, had been sailing to various parts of Southeast Asia since Song times (Wolters 1967 (Wolters , 1970 . The chaos that swept China during the Ming collapse and the Qing takeover disrupted this trade and the role played by maritime Chinese. Particularly, the rebel leader Zheng Chenggong added yet another problematic element to the situation (Yamawaki 1976) . When the dust had settled and the Qing government permitted a resumption of trade with the region, there appears to have been a considerable demand for the products of tropical Southeast Asia, a demand that could not really be met by the production of Southeast Asian labor on its own. As a result, a new element entered the situation; this was the introduction of Chinese labor into Southeast Asia for the purpose of producing those goods (Trocki 1997 (Trocki , 1990 .
It is important to understand that the migration of "coolie labor" from China to Southeast Asia is a relatively recent phenomenon. There is no record of Chinese laborers coming to the region until the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century (Blussé 1981) . It is also important to understand that this migration seems to have begun largely as a response to the growth of the Chinese domestic economy and an increasing demand, in China, for products such as tin, gold, pepper and sugar. During the period 1680-1720, we find the first appearance of settlements of Chinese laborers in various parts of Southeast Asia who came there expressly to produce these commodities for shipment back to China.
The earliest of significant Chinese colonies seems to have been the settlement of Ming refugees in southern Vietnam, in what was then really Cambodian territory, but which the Nguyen rulers of Dang Trong saw as "open" land. This was the region known to Europeans as Cochinchina. Of particular interest here was the trading settlement and virtually autonomous city-state of Hatien 2 (Ste. Vierge 1770) , located at the top of the western coast of the Camau Peninsula. The Cantonese refugee/pirate/tax farmer, Mac Cuu, founded this sometime around 1690 (Gaspardone 1952; Puangthong Rungswasdisab 1994; Sakurai 2004; Sellers 1983) . At some point, Mac Cuu paid tribute to the Cambodian king, who recognized him as the gambling farmer of the town. Apparently to hedge his bets, the Chinese adventurer also, at various times sent tribute to the Nguyen ruler and to the Siamese king.
There is no record that Hatien was actually a center for the production of any specific commodities. Rather, in the tradition of Malay port-polities in the region, it graduated from what was apparently a pirate center into an entrepot. During the eighteenth century, the town became an important trading center for the products of Cambodia, Cochinchina, and possibly for the Siamese towns around the shore of the Gulf of Siam, and even for centers in Borneo, Sumatra and Java. This was the core of what a group of scholars are now calling the Chinese "Water Frontier" (Cooke and Li 2004) .
Ng Chin Keong's ground-breaking study of the "Amoy Network" looks at the commerce of Xiamen, or Amoy, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It was then one of the main ports trading with Southeast Asia. Ng reports large numbers of "emigrants" on board the ocean junks leaving China after 1683. Each junk generally carried between 200 and 300 migrants. These were not members of the crew and they were not traders, so it seems logical to assume that a considerable number of them were laborers. So numerous were those going abroad in this manner that the government attempted to stop, or at least reduce the number of ships sailing to Southeast Asia, but the movement of people, legal or not, continued. By 1729 there were 21 ships leaving Amoy on the northeast monsoon. This number increased considerably in succeeding years. In 1733, 28 to 30 junks left Fujian and in 1755, 74 vessels returned to Amoy from the Nanyang. This migration, together with the trade conducted in these ships represented "a commercial boom which surpassed any in the past" (Ng 1983: 56-57) . Although there is no clear statement in the sources, it seems logical to assume that the commerce was to a great extent generated by the products of the migrant laborers.
By the 1780s a quick look at the map of Southeast Asia (see map) shows that a number of similar settlements had popped up all around the Gulf of Siam, the coasts of the Malay Peninsula, Borneo and Sumatra. Of particular note were the pepper and gambier planters in Riau, tin miners in Bangka, gold miners in Sambas and Pontianak, sugar planters in Kedah, and pepper planters in Brunei, Chantaburi, and elsewhere in the region. In addition to the production and export of these products, Chinese traders were increasingly involved in developing the rice trade between Southeast Asia and China (Trocki 1997) .
Chinese Labor Organization
One of the key features of these early settlements was their organizational structure. While it is difficult to make blanket statements about all of them, so Map 1. Major Chinese Settlement Areas in Southeast Asia ca. 1820, and the Major Opium Trading Centers in South and East Asia far as we know, a number of them had developed some sort of self-rule organized around the "kongsi" principle. That is, since most of these were in isolated areas, particularly the mines, Chinese settlers were left very much on their own and often had to provide for their own defense. Even though many of them were founded with the support and cooperation of local Malay or Siamese rulers, they often stood outside the domestic political and economic life of the local state. What is more, as they grew, they often came to represent a presence of greater strength and solidarity than many of the local governments. There was thus a tendency for them to become autonomous, and even independent, self-governing settlements.
Hatien, despite maintaining some sort of "tributary" relationship with Siam, Cambodia and Vietnam, appears to have been largely independent during the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century. Mac Cuu was recognized as its ruler, establishing a dynasty and passing government to his son, Mac Thien Tu, on his death. Although the Cambodian and Vietnamese kings treated them as a "governors," they were essentially sovereign monarchs. We hear nothing of kongsis in Hatien. Forms of government in the more remote centers, however, often varied widely.
Following Wang Tai Peng's observations on the Borneo kongsis and my own research on the kongsis in eighteenth-century Riau and nineteenth-century Johor, it seems that a unique organizational framework may have characterized many of these settlements in the initial stages (Trocki 1990; Wang 1995) . Mary Somers Heidhues has also studied the kongsis of Bangka as well as those in Borneo (Heidhues 1993) . According to Wang, the kongsis were originally set up as partnerships in which all or most of the laborers and taukehs, or headmen and capitalists, were members. They espoused egalitarian principles, which were often at odds with conventional Confucian orthodoxy. Finally, these partnerships were often confirmed as ritual brotherhoods which drew on the mythology, ceremony and popular religion of the peasants of South China (Heidhues 1993) .
From the point of view of outsiders, there was little to distinguish them from secret societies, and in fact, there was little difference. These kongsis, however, were not usually involved in criminal activity, but they did begin to take on the trappings of a state over time, and were thus seen as a threat by local government authorities. Likewise, they were not necessarily secret except in a ritual sense. Where they formed the basis of community, as they did in Borneo, Riau, Bangka and nineteenth-century Johor, they were in fact, very public bodies (Trocki 1997 (Trocki , 1979 .
Wang argues that the kongsis oversaw relations among the planters, or miners and the capitalists who financed them. Each had a share in the profits of the venture whether he contributed labor or capital. In the early stages, these kongsis were usually made up of men who were related to one another or who came from the same villages; and initially, the kongsi could be quite small. My own work on Johor indicates that kongsis were often formed by a group of men all bearing the same surname (Trocki 1979) . A typical pepper and gambier kongsi in Johor would thus begin with a small group of closely associated planters and usually with a capitalist or taukeh. Each member would hold at least one share and the taukeh might hold five out of ten. Generally speaking, in Bangka and in Borneo the headman of a kongsi was usually known to Europeans as teko or taiko, which appears to be a corruption of "big brother," a title typical of the head of a secret society in later times.
In the Hakka gold-mining kongsis of western Borneo, the small kongsis that ran each mine ultimately consolidated into very large kongsis that collected taxes, raised armies and fought wars. Early nineteenth-century reports, such as that by George Windsor Earl, describe these as "democratic" in that decisions affecting the group were taken only after extensive public discussion and votes (Earl 1837 (Earl rep. 1971 . Wang too agrees that these represented a native form of Chinese democracy. He argues that there was a strong egalitarian ideology underlying the kongsi principle and that it was rooted in the popular beliefs of ritual brotherhood that were common among Chinese peasants. He also associates the origins of these kongsis with the officers and crews of the ships in Zheng Chenggong's navy (Wang 1995: 46-47) . James C. Jackson, who has studied the kongsis both in Borneo and those on the tin island of Bangka, generally agrees with the idea that the mines were communal and democratic (Jackson 1970 (Jackson , 1969 .
Newcomers could come to the mining fields, work for a while, and once they had paid off their passage, they too could acquire shares in mines. They could also join with their colleagues and open new mines as joint ventures. In all of these enterprises, capital was necessary. It was necessary for the miners to have food and provisions to support them until such time as the mine paid off. These matters were arranged with a taukeh who would "stake" the miners with provisions in exchange for his own share in the mine and often with a guarantee that he could purchase the produce at a fixed price.
While the kongsis may have been ritually egalitarian, economic relations were characterized by inequality. One of the key features of these settlements is that most of them were not self-sufficient. They were commercial outposts and were dedicated to the production of export products. They thus also needed to import most of their consumer goods. These came largely from China, with the exception of rice. They were thus linked to the overall commercial system of Southeast Asia from which they imported most of their food and other provisions.
The arrangements for financing and providing support for these mining and planting communities were usually to the disadvantage of the laborers. Foodstuffs and other supplies were provided at inflated prices, sometimes four to six times their market value and the products of the mines and plantations were usually undervalued by nearly the same proportions (Trocki 1975 (Trocki , 1979 . 3 Nevertheless, it was still possible, at least during the peak periods of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for the laborers to make enough to satisfy their ambitions and many were able to gather together enough profit to return home wealthier than when they had left.
If capital was scarce in the mining fields, so too was labor. The miners and their backers, whether they were Chinese merchants or Malay chiefs, needed each other. Despite the technological advances that Chinese miners brought to Southeast Asia, mining was still a labor-intensive business and the whole purpose of bringing Chinese laborers to the region had been to fill the labor shortage in the first place. Labor was expensive, not only because of its scarcity, but also because with organizations like the kongsis, workers could use their solidarity to demand at least a living wage. While they may not have had direct access to the market, they were not far, and they at least had to be paid enough to cover their living expenses. Laborers could easily strike or simply walk off the job and find another mine; moreover, as their numbers increased, they could and did organize their own military forces.
By the late eighteenth century, these mining and planting settlements had become considerable establishments. Jackson estimates that the tin mining community in Bangka had come to number about 25,000 people and was producing about 3,500 tons annually (Jackson 1969) . In the early nineteenth century, the Chinese population of the west Borneo gold fields was probably in the neighborhood of 40,000 (Jackson 1970) . I have estimated the population of pepper and gambier planters at Riau in the 1780s as about 10,000 as well (Trocki 1979) . When Phraya Taksin arrived in Chantaburi with a ragged force of 500 men, he was able to raise an army of 5,000, with which he returned to Thonburi to oust the Burmese invaders (Nidhi Aeusrivongse 1986). 4 One must assume that the majority of these were the pepper planters who had settled there earlier in the century. Not only were the numbers of Chinese laborers large, but they were beginning to have an impact on the politics of the region.
This tendency toward autonomy distinguished them from other forms of labor in Southeast Asia at the time. Europeans remarked on the difficulties of dealing with Chinese labor, particularly those organized in kongsis. They found these communities quite different from those of wealthier merchants and traders who inhabited the port cities. Ultimately, Europeans came to identify the kongsis as dangerous societies and identified them with the secret societies which were also banned by the Qing government. T.J. Newbold, who wrote about the British settlements in Malaya in the early nineteenth century observed:
It is not unreasonable to infer that the Chinese colonists at Malacca, in Java, Borneo and other parts of the Indian Archipelago at an early period after emigration would find the advantages of binding themselves together as a means of defence and self-protection in a foreign land. Many of them had probably been members … in their native land. Henceforth numerous "Kongsees" or public clubs with which we find them invariably linked particularly in the mines and plantations in the interior (Newbold and Wilson 1841) .
Certainly, as Europeans established governments of their own in the region, it was natural that they would see these organizations as a threat. By the middle of the nineteenth century there were movements by both colonial and indigenous governments to check the power of these groups. Interestingly, these came at the same time that the control of opium began to become a major issue in the region.
The Opium Trade and the Kongsis of Southeast Asia
Muslim, Portuguese and other European country traders had been carrying opium to Southeast Asia and to China for centuries before the eighteenth century. The major shift in the trade came with the British seizure of the opium fields of Bihar and Varanasi (then called Benares) following the battle of Plassey in 1757. With the acquisition of the "dewani," or the right to collect taxes in the territories of the Nawab of Bengal, the East India Company (EIC) servants in Patna and Ghaziphur gained the monopolies over the opium cultivation in those districts. From then on British merchants and British ship captains dominated the opium trade of Asia. After a period of private control of the opium fields, the Company itself appropriated the monopoly, and from 1780 onward assumed full control of opium production in its territories.
Since opium was already illegal in China and had already been recognized as a "dangerous" drug, and was indeed being "abused" by significant numbers of Chinese, the EIC found it inappropriate to carry the drug to China in their own ships. As a result, after gathering in the opium produced under its monopoly from Patna and Ghaziphur, the Company brought the drug to Calcutta and auctioned off the entire crop. The drug was purchased by speculators and other merchants and shippers who then contracted with one of the British country traders to take it to China.
The country traders were only allowed to operate in the "country," that is, in India. By the eighteenth century, however, this had come to include everywhere east of Suez and the Cape of Good Hope. They traded in India under the license of the EIC and they needed the approval of the Company to do business in Canton. Aside from that, they were usually on their own. Their ships were wellarmed and when they sailed out from Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay, no one asked too many questions about their itineraries or activities. From the 1760s onward, opium came to make up increasing amounts of their cargoes. They also carried rather mixed cargoes which included Indian cloth, gunpowder and guns, tools, and other goods from Europe, the Middle East and the subcontinent. They stopped at numerous locations throughout Southeast Asia before arriving in Macau. A vessel from Calcutta might stop at Aceh, Kedah, Melaka, Riau, Palembang, Batavia, Banjarmasin, Sulu, Trengganu, and Brunei. They exchanged what goods were in demand in the region for goods they could trade in China or India (Bulley 2000; Morse 1926-29; Parkinson 1937) .
Over time, the amounts of opium they carried tended to increase until the Company decided to cap production at between 4,000 and 5,000 chests annually. 5 This remained the rough annual output for nearly 40 years, between about 1780 and 1820. The aim of the Company was to maintain a steady income at what they saw as an optimum level. They feared that overproduction would drive down the price. By 1820, however, a number of factors began to change the dynamics of the trade. On the one hand, the Napoleonic wars had concluded and with the French out of the picture, the British and the Dutch were reaching a new modus vivendi in Southeast Asia that would see Britain emerge as the major European power in the region. Secondly, the price of opium was rising to alarming levels reaching about $1,000 a chest, which was double the price of a decade earlier.
This price rise tempted a number of newcomers to go into the opium business. These included the Americans who were already active in the Sumatran pepper trade and the Northwest Pacific fur trade. They began bringing Turkish and Persian opium to China and Southeast Asia. More serious competition came from the independent Indian states of the western part of the subcontinent, particularly the Malwa area. Also, although not fully recognized at the time, Chinese growers had also entered the market (Trocki 1999) .
To meet the Malwa competition, the EIC, among other things, ultimately decided to increase its own production, and by 1830 production coming from both sides of India (Bombay and Calcutta) was beginning to flood the market. Although the price was now dropping, the quantities were increasing at unprecedented rates, so that by the late 1830s (the time of the Opium War), India was exporting more than 20,000 chests annually (Trocki 1999) .
As early as the 1770s, the country traders had been frequenting the ports of Southeast Asia in search of cargoes for China. They had already been purchasing the production of those colonies of Chinese laborers in the region. They were trading at Riau for the pepper of Bentan and for the tin of Bangka and the gold of Sambas and other parts of western Borneo. In addition to weapons and gunpowder, opium was one of the major exchange commodities in this trade. It is also clear that Riau was distributing this opium to Siam, Java, and Cochinchina in exchange for rice. Much of this trade was carried in Chinese junks, and it is perhaps not surprising that opium began to find its way into the supplies going to the Chinese coolies in jungles of the region. Recent research by a number of students has begun to demonstrate these links. There was an active trade in tin from Hatien to Macau and Canton. Since Hatien produced no tin, it seems reasonable to conclude that it was coming from Bangka and the Malay Peninsula (Van Dyke 2004). 6 Opium was an attractive consumer item for the coolies in these Southeast Asian settlements. In fact, it came to be seen as a virtual necessity. In the nineteenth century, there were regular reports that mining coolies would desert the diggings if the opium supply failed. In most cases they had few opportunities for relief or entertainment. They lived in all-male communities where even prostitutes were scarce. They worked long hours in very difficult conditions: clearing the rainforest; digging out the hills; keeping their crops clear of weeds and pests; constructing and maintaining mining equipment and often standing in bone-chilling water up to their knees shovelling the ore through the sluices. Opium killed their pain and eased their loneliness. It was also their only form of medicine, a fact that was true of most of the world at the time. Not only was it a sovereign painkiller, but it stopped up bowels loosened by dysentery and relieved the fevers of malaria and other tropical microbes. If it were not addictive and potentially fatal, it would have been the best thing possible for the laborers in these isolated situations.
The flow of opium to the Chinese coolies gradually became an important aspect of the general commerce of the region, and it also became a part of the larger political economy. In the first place, opium changed the political and economic dynamics of the kongsi. This was one more provision that the coolies purchased from the taukehs and although it must have been a luxury in the beginning, it quickly became a necessity. As such it became an ideal vehicle for keeping coolies permanently indebted to the taukehs and in shifting the balance of power between capital and labor. In time, the coolies would have been required to give up their shares in the kongsi, leaving the taukehs with the ownership of the mines and plantations. Thus, the coolies got poorer and the taukehs became wealthier (Trocki 1999) .
As the laborers also lost control of the kongsis, they ceased to have a voice in the affairs and profits of the ventures and became mere wage laborers. Caught in "company store" situations it was even more difficult to stay out of debt and to avoid working for nothing. In the end, in fact it appears that most coolies did work for nothing since their wages went to cover their debts which were never paid off. The ability to mark up prices and to offer below market prices for the products of these enterprises ensured that the taukehs got marketable commodities at prices well below their actual value. As they took control of the kongsi, the taukehs also gained control of the kongsi's security forces, the samsengs or thugs who were available to both keep the coolies in line, and at the same time to protect the interests of the taukehs.
During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, it appears that the egalitarian principles and generally communal nature of the kongsis may have prevailed. Certainly in Borneo, the kongsis managed to hold out against the Dutch, fielding their own armies and maintaining a high degree of autonomy (Wang 1995) . As the Dutch came to ally themselves with the taukehs, giving them the right to hold monopolies on the sale of opium, spirits, gambling concessions and other economic resources, the taukehs switched sides and deserted the kongsis and allied themselves with the Dutch. The British, who had freely sold arms throughout Southeast Asia during the eighteenth century, now refused to sell them against Dutch prohibitions, although they continued to sell them to "legitimate" states (Crawfurd rep. 1987) .
It was the institution of tax farming that made possible the alliance between wealthy Chinese merchants and the colonial and native states of Southeast Asia. Colonial states throughout Southeast Asia as well as indigenous states employed Chinese merchants as tax gatherers. Opium monopolies were one of the most lucrative concessions. They were rented to the wealthier taukehs as "farms." These provided a secure income stream from the coolies to the states. In this way, opium integrated the economies and the power structures of the overseas Chinese communities into the colonial states. With their commanding positions within the kongsis, the taukehs were able to control them to serve the interests of the colonial system.
The kongsis did not fade easily from the scene. The laborers understood that control of opium meant control of their own political and economic destinies. Even though the odds were generally against them, they continued to resist domination by the taukeh-state alliances. I think that it is possible to read the wave of so-called "secret society riots" in places as diverse as Siam, Singapore, Riau, Borneo, and Cochinchina as a kind of primitive class struggle. I have made this argument in an earlier work, and am not sure that everyone found it convincing. Nonetheless, it is an idea too intriguing to let go (Trocki 1990: 40-50) .
There is the issue of simultaneity when we see the same scenarios played out in a number of distinct and separate places across the region at roughly the same time. Either the secret societies organized rebellions, or the state moved to crack down on what they claimed was illegal activity by the societies. In more cases than not, the issue at the bottom of the dispute was the control of opium. The first stirrings of secret society activity seem to have begun in the two decades between 1830 and 1850.
Interestingly, it seems quite certain that the kongsis, or what were later identified as secret societies, had probably been in existence for quite some time earlier. We know, for instance that the Borneo kongsis dated back to the early eighteenth century. It seems evident that some sort of kongsi organization existed at Riau prior to 1780, and if it did not, it certainly was there by 1790. There were also kongsis in Bangka, and it seems likely that they existed among the miners on both sides of the Malay Peninsula by the beginning of the nineteenth century, if not earlier. The situation in Siam is less certain. Walter Vella notes that the first reports of secret society activity date from 1824 when the Siamese government made its first move to suppress one. There is no evidence that they existed before that time, but there is also no evidence that they did not. It is doubtful that they had only just appeared when the Siamese decided to suppress them. More likely, they had been around for some time, but had not previously been perceived as a threat, or else the government did not feel adequately in control to confront them.
In some cases, the societies were involved in opium smuggling and in other cases rioting and outright rebellion. In1848, after killing the owner of a sugar mill in Chachoengsao, the members of a Chinese secret society took over the town itself. In the suppression of the revolt and the reaction among Siamese that followed, thousands of Chinese were killed (Vella 1957: 18) . Vella speculates that aside from overt crimes committed by members of these societies, "… the mere existence of well-organized groups of individuals numbering in the hundreds or even thousands may well have been viewed by the government as a threat to security" (Vella 1957: 19) .
The year 1825 seems to be the first indication that such societies existed in Singapore. That was probably the year in which Munshi Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir witnessed an initiation ceremony of the Heaven and Earth Society, or the Ghee Hin. He was one of Raffles' scribes and the Malay teacher for many of the first Europeans in the Straits Settlements (Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir rep. 1970). Clearly the society had been active in Singapore some time before then and was clearly involved with the pepper and gambier agriculture.
The violation of the farmer's monopoly, a problem inherent in opium smuggling, was one of the most common crimes in Singapore during this period. The first important secret society violence, the Chinese Funeral Riots in 1846, occurred at a time when the leadership of both the major secret society and the Singapore opium and spirit farms were changing hands. Wu Xiao An's study of Chinese business in Kedah and Penang shows that control of the revenue farms was always a matter that was hotly contested, and that powerful revenue farmers either controlled the local secret society, or else they found themselves forced to combat it (Wu 1999).
The communal and egalitarian ethos of the kongsi, however meaningful it was to the members of these societies, was not really able to stand the temptation of unprecedented wealth and power represented by the alliance between the Chinese taukehs and the colonial states. The men who controlled the revenue farms were always the wealthiest and most powerful individuals in the local community. If a secret society leader was successful in forcing his way into a position of power in the farming syndicate on the basis of his armed strength, he might immediately turn around and make common cause with the state which gave him the monopoly. This appears to have been the case in Singapore when in 1846, one Lau Joon Teck seems to have bullied his way into the syndicate. By his death in 1859, he was known to Europeans as "the moneyed man of the farms," and the Ghee Hin Kongsi, or secret society, had become a part of his force of "revenue peons." His successor, Tan Seng Poh, who controlled the holdings of the powerful Teochew taukeh, Seah Eu Chin, in the 1860s and 1870s, was able to dispense with the secret societies altogether and recruit his own personal force of revenue police (Trocki 1990) .
It is important to understand the evolution of secret societies in the eyes of Europeans in the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the century, if they were aware of them at all, secret societies were seen as powerful organizations that had to be pacified and somehow or other, brought into the management of the colonial enterprise. Failing that, as was usually the case, they were seen as a "state within a state," not really as criminals, but perhaps even more dangerous. It was only in their final incarnation in the 1870s, subsequent to being ousted from the revenue farming business that they then came to be viewed as extortionists and petty criminals.
Opium was an important factor in breaking down the autonomy of the kongsi and therefore of Chinese labor as it came into confrontation with the expanding European colonial empires and the global capitalist system. Chinese labor was made subservient to the state and to capital. At the same time, another shift occurred, and that was in the ownership and purchase of the goods produced by Chinese labor. At the start of the labor migration, the aim of production was to supply goods to the China market. By the middle of the nineteenth century, that had changed. As Indian opium, whose flow was controlled by Britain, flooded into Southeast Asia and China, it also had an impact on China's purchasing power. Europeans found that they had a need for the products of Chinese labor in Southeast Asia. From the 1830s onward, goods such as pepper, tin, gambier, tapioca, tobacco and others began to flow into Europe rather than China. They were still produced by Chinese labor in Southeast Asia, but ultimately all of them began to move to Europe.
There were two reasons for this shift in the flow of trade. Both of them had to do with opium. On the one hand, opium was flowing into China at such an alarming rate that China was now exporting silver, where once they had imported it. Simply put, China was becoming much poorer in relation to the West. In about 1850, Rutherford Alcock estimated that China was spending about 10 million taels on opium annually while it was selling only 2 million taels' worth of tea. China's new export was people, and their main function was to serve the demands of the expanding European market (Great Britain House of Commons 1849: 75).
The Role of Singapore
In laying out the story of opium and the Chinese migration, it is important to understand the role of Singapore. The British trading center which was founded in 1819 by Thomas Stamford Raffles brought together all of the elements of the new order in Southeast Asia. In particular, it was a British free port. It was protected by the Royal Navy and was a place where the British country traders could unload their precious cargoes of the Indian drug. It was also a place where Chinese and other Asian merchants could gather and amass their fortunes without fear of the depredations of "native" chiefs.
Singapore, in addition to lying beside the only clear, deep channel between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, was also at the center of a line running north and south linking Dutch Batavia and Bangkok. Between those two capitals lay most of the major kongsi settlements in Southeast Asia. To the north were the two coasts of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and the Gulf of Siam. Beyond that lay the populous mainland states of Burma to the west and Siam and Vietnam to the east. The west coast of the Peninsula was then being settled by groups of adventurous tin miners from bases in Penang and Melaka. On a tangent to the west were the pepper gardens of Aceh. The east coast of the Peninsula was dotted with settlements of Chinese, Malays and Siamese producing rice, pepper, tin, gold, bird's nest and the vast range of forest produce always in demand in China. Off to the northeast were the pepper ports of Chantaburi with sugar, tobacco and endless supplies of dried and salted fish. Beyond that were Cambodia and Cochinchina and important supplies of rice, fish, and sugar.
To the south was Riau, the port which had set the pattern for Singapore in the previous century. It still housed a settlement of several thousand Chinese pepper and gambier planters which centered on the Sino-Bugis settlement of Tanjong Pinang. The Dutch had only recently re-occupied it in 1818. The islands to its south -Lingga, Bangka and Belitung (Billiton) were major tin mining areas. Bangka had been the site of major mining kongsis since the early eighteenth century and these continued to be productive throughout the nineteenth century. To the south was Java and to the east the Java Sea, Banjarmasin, Sulawesi and the islands of the eastern archipelago.
Singapore became the center of the Chinese economy of Southeast Asia. As the center of the opium trade, Singapore was where the traders servicing these settlements came for their supplies. As the center of Chinese trade, Singapore was where the junks from China landed. In particular, it became the headquarters of Southeast Asia's Chinese labor exchange. Laborers and coolies came to Singapore first and were then shipped out to the various mines or plantations in the surrounding areas. Singapore was thus not only the headquarters of the opium trade, but also the center of the labor trade, or the coolie traffic, as it was then known.
Singapore was the source of capital and the source of labor. Naturally, the products of all these areas flowed back there. The port became the center of the region's commodity trade. As a trading port it did not really draw much trade away from other areas. In fact, John Crawfurd argued at the time that Singapore had in fact, increased the overall trade of the region. In a matter of months after its founding, the Chinese junk traders, Bugis traders and British merchants began to flock to Singapore. Within five years, Singapore's trade grew to a value of over $13 million annually (Crawfurd rep. 1987 ). Crawfurd argued that Singapore had greatly contributed to an absolute increase in British trade in Asia. Answering critics that Singapore simply drew trade from Penang, he pointed out that in 1818, the whole of direct British trade with the Straits of Malacca, and generally with the eastern islands (excluding Java) centerd at Penang, totaled $2,030,757's worth of exports. In 1824, however, the joint exports of Penang and Singapore were $9,414,464, of which $6,604,601 was exported through Singapore (Crawfurd rep. 1987) .
What was the basis of this sudden increase in British trade? Certainly an important share of it was opium. In 1823-24, $8,515,100's worth of opium was shipped to China. Even though not all of this was landed in the Straits, much of it was. Its location moreover, gave Singapore a more advantageous position than Penang. In addition to serving as a base for British trade, it was better able to tap into the very active trade carried on by Chinese junks in the South China Sea, the Gulf of Siam and the Java Sea.
Even though trade generally increased, many of the older centers now sank into relative obscurity. Tanjong Pinang, the port of Riau, had become a quiet backwater by the mid-nineteenth century (Earl 1837 (Earl rep. 1971 . Hatien, possibly the key port of the Gulf of Siam in the eighteenth century, had been sacked by one army after another (the Siamese, the Taysons, the army of the Nguyen) in the years between 1768 and 1800. It had lost population and seen its leadership weaken. Moreover, the town had been brought more firmly under the control of Hue, at least in theory. In 1833, it was caught up in the Cochinchinese rebellion following the death of Le Van Duyet and was once again sacked and its population massacred. Most of these would have been Chinese (Sellers 1983) . As a more central location, and as a free port under the British, Singapore had replaced the earlier centers of the old Water Frontier and had become the new focus of the Chinese economy of Southeast Asia.
The consolidation of new states on the mainland, particularly Siam and Vietnam, had done much to reduce the autonomy of the earliest Chinese settlements in the region, and by the middle of the nineteenth century, these towns had become backwaters. Wealthy Chinese merchants remaining in those countries had gravitated to places like Bangkok and Saigon. These became the new growth centers for these countries and both became important trading partners of Singapore.
In the islands, the colonial empires of the British and the Dutch took their toll on Chinese settlements. Even though it is incorrect to say that the imperial governments "controlled" the Chinese, they had made a start. They had coopted the wealthier merchants, often Straits-born peranakans, into the colonial enterprise. Using opium as capital, they had begun to buy out, as it were, the products of Chinese miners and planters in the region, and their states had come to depend on the consumption of these coolies for their income, which was collected by the merchants who had become the revenue farmers.
Peranakan Chinese in Southeast Asia
The role of the peranakan Chinese was a crucial one throughout the nineteenth century. Particularly in the British possessions, the "Straits Chinese" as they came to be called, were the key allies of the colonial powers in governing the masses of the immigrant Chinese. This group of individuals, many of whom could trace their ancestry back to Chinese settled in the region prior to the British arrival, were among the original inhabitants of the Straits Settlements. Their families had been established at Riau, Melaka and Kedah before the mid-eighteenth century. They had already worked with Malay chiefs and Dutch burghers as well as Portuguese traders and the other commercial groups of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. They also, despite their long residence in the region, maintained family and business links with China.
With the foundation of Singapore, they emerged as the key allies of the Europeans. It is probable that these resident Chinese had formed close relations with the Dutch in Java and Melaka as early as the seventeenth century. When the British established bases in the region, they also gravitated to Penang and later to Melaka and Singapore as the number of British settlements increased. Because they could speak Malay, and later learned English, they could communicate with the British. They also had the advantage of local knowledge and familiarity with the other Chinese.
They became the partners of the Europeans in managing the Chinese populations of their settlements. As such, they also became some of the wealthiest and influential individuals in the region. One element of their power and wealth was their durability. They were able to maintain family lines in the immigrant environment through a variety of social and economic institutions which included temples, family kongsis, business partnerships, judicious marriage alliances and extensive networking. As China-born Chinese gained wealth or influence, peranakans had the advantage of possessing marriageable women. It became customary to marry their daughters to these men who had wealth, but no family in Southeast Asia, and to bring these sons-in-law into their families, contrary to the usual Chinese practice of partrilocality (Song 1923 (Song rep. 1967 ).
Jennifer Cushman has described one such family in the Khaws of Penang and Ranong in southern Siam (Cushman 1991) . Others include the five clans associated with major kongsi foundations in Penang: the Khoo, the Cheah, the Lim, the Yeoh and the Tan, not to mention a number of other clans who are outside this group of five. Throughout the nineteenth century, a number of family groups were dominant in Singapore, including the Seah, the Tan Tock Seng family, the Tan Cheng Lock family and the Cheang family. Some of these had their origins in Melaka which remained the family base into the twentieth century (Song 1923 (Song rep. 1967 .
One of the primary sources of wealth and power among these families was the opium revenue farms. From the beginning of the British presence in the region to the end of the revenue farming system in 1910, members of these families tended to dominate the revenue farms of both Penang and Singapore. In so doing, they also tended to control those of the Malay and Dutch territories which adjoined the Straits Settlements. My work on Singapore has shown that a small number of Singapore families controlled the opium farms, not only for decades at a time, but also over an extensive area which included Johor, Melaka and Dutch-controlled Riau (Trocki 1993 (Trocki , 1990 . Penang taukehs, such as the Lims and the Choongs, controlled the farms of Kedah and other west coast states, eastern Sumatra and the states of southern Siam (Wu 1999). Cushman's work on the Khaw family shows similarly extensive networking and consolidation of revenue farms.
These families not only maintained networks among the other powerful Straits Chinese families, but also with key sinkeh, or newly arrived Chinese who had become wealthy taukehs. They thus held positions in the secret societies, or were able to influence their actions without actually holding formal membership. To hold revenue farms, it was also necessary to maintain close relations, sometimes hidden ones, with important European merchants and government officials. Recent evidence shows that certain colonial officials had Chinese favorites. It was, after all, necessary for a revenue farmer to be someone who was known as a trustworthy individual. The facts that Straits Chinese could speak English, had their roots in the colony, and were often British subjects were all points in their favor (Wu 2003) .
Conclusion
We see an interesting transformation over the course of the nineteenth century. Colonialism in the islands and state consolidation in mainland Southeast Asia were both heavily reliant on the labor, manpower, and economic power of the Chinese migrants who established the Water Frontier. Ironically, however, they also destroyed the power of the Chinese kongsis and helped to undermine the wealth and influence of the prominent towns of the Chinese water frontier of the eighteenth century. However, by the mid-nineteenth century, indigenized Chinese groups such as the Straits Chinese were able to carve out a place for themselves within the British and other European empires. They were also able to establish important positions within the Siamese state.
For most of the nineteenth century, opium was the vehicle by which they attained their places. Singapore and Penang in particular became the bases from which cliques of peranakan Chinese could expand into the rest of Southeast Asia both through their own networks as well as through those of the colonial empires and the indigenous rulers.
Throughout the nineteenth century, we find that there were two or three cliques, composed mainly of Hokkien, Straits-born Chinese merchants together with a few Teochew and Cantonese allies, controlling the opium farms of most of British Malaya, southern Siam and Sumatra. Interestingly, it seems that these same groups also dominated the shipment of laborers from the ports of Fujian and the Chaozhou areas of Guangdong province. They thus controlled the supplies of both labor and capital for much of the commodity-producing enterprises of island Southeast Asia. They also extended their commercial reach through links to Bangkok, Saigon, and Hong Kong, and in some cases even Australia and the United States. Wherever Chinese labor went, so too went opium and the influence of these merchants.
Their domination of the developing domestic economy in each place was their forte. Controlling both labor and opium was the key. Labor was not only the major productive force, but it represented the major body of consumers. Thus, the economy that supplied not only the Chinese laborers but also the indigenous Southeast Asian peasants was virtually constructed by these extensions of the overseas Chinese financial networks.
By the 1880s however, things began to change. Between 1881 and 1910, the revenue farming system was eliminated in one colony after another, and the Chinese magnates lost their bases of power, influence, and wealth. 7 Although they might have retained some share in labor recruitment and commodity production, it was necessary to seek other avenues of enterprise. Some succeeded, making the transition from revenue farming to banking and finance. Others invested their money in property and trained their children as professionals. Still others gradually frittered away their fortunes, some of them through addiction to opium which they acquired by purchasing it from government-controlled monopolies.
Although Chinese capitalists in Southeast Asia had been separated from opium, the trade continued to flourish and Chinese, both in Southeast Asia and in China itself, continued to be the major consumers of opium. Despite continuing production of opium in India, China itself now became the major producer of opium. By the 1920s, Indian production was in sharp decline, but in China, it flourished until the 1950s when it was wiped out by the Chinese Communist Party (Zhou 2000).
Notes
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 5th Conference of the International Society for the Studies of Chinese Overseas (ISSCO), Elsinore, Denmark, 10-14 May 2004. 2 The towns, or settlements near it, were known by a variety of names by various peoples.
Malays called it "Kuala;" the Siamese called it "Puntaimas;" the Hokkien and Teochiu Chinese called it "Kangkao;" and the Cambodians called it "Bantaey Mas" or "Peam." I am grateful to Nola Cooke for providing me with this reference and information on the various names of Hatien and the nearby region. 3 These were the conditions that prevailed in nineteenth-century Johor. Indications are that similar arrangements existed in Pontianak and Bangka. 4 I am grateful to my wife, Orrawin Trocki, and to Orrasa Jirapinyo for translating key portions of this book for me. 5 A standard chest of opium from the EIC factories at Patna and Ghaziphur weighed about 140 lb, or about 60 kg. It contained 40 balls of raw opium each weighing about 3 lb, or 1.5 kg; 4,000 chests were equivalent to about 280 tons. 6 Van Dyke's detailed study of the Yan family in Canton has thrown much new light on the wide-ranging connections that linked this traffic in tin from Southeast Asia to the tea trade. Apparently tin was a necessary adjunct to the international trade in tea. Tea had to be packaged while still fresh and then carried down from the upland plantations in Fujian to the coast. The only material that was suitable for packing the tea turned out to be tin. It was light enough to transport, impervious enough to preserve the tea in its fresh state, and would not react with the tea and change its taste. 7 I have discussed at some length the end of the revenue system in Southeast Asia in my book (1990), ch. 7, "The Demise of the Farming System." The major motivation was the desire on the part of colonial regimes to rationalize their imperial administrations, and the farming system had come to seem an inefficient hangover from the early nineteenth century. It was also realized by the Europeans that the farming system placed a great deal of power, as well as money, in the hands of Chinese entrepreneurs, both of which the colonial administrations were eager to take into their own hands.
